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HovmR W. SMIT4
I appear here as advocate in behalf of this person, man, to
plead the case of Science versus Metaphysics. The issue involved
is briefly this: for some time past metaphysics has claimed guardi-
anship over him; but the assertions upon which metaphysics bases
its claim to this prerogative are, I protest, not only wanting in sub-
stantiation but are for the most part false and misleading and
therefore actually or potentially injurious to him. Consequently, I
seek to have the metaphysician restrained from further inter-
ference in his affairs.
I will proceed by laying before you my credentials, then I will
seek to establish what I contend to be man's basic natural right
from which, I submit, issue all value considerations. I will establish
that man has in the past, and continues to be, prevented from en-
joying this natural right to his fullest advantage by these unsub-
stantiated propositions, for the persistent continuation of which
the metaphysician is responsible. I will present evidence that when
relieved of these unsubstantiated representations he can be suf-
ficient unto himself, he can stand on his own feet. And lastly, I
repeat, I will petition the court to take appropriate action to pro-
tect his person from further injuries such as he has suffered in
the past.
By metaphysics I mean all unsupported speculation that tran-
scends physically observable fact. Whatever guise he wears, I say
to every metaphysician, every knower of the unknown, that he and
I have only this in common: we both esteem truth as a value. Un-
happily, however, we have different definitions of truth, and there-
in lies the reason for our disagreement.
As I see the matter, this difference in our definition of truth
brings us into utterly incompatible and irreconcilable positions.
There can be no middle ground between us, no compromise, and
should that day come when in order to survive he and I might be
brought into physical rather than dialectic combat, one should have
to do the other to death, because we both believe (and here is an-
other of our mutual values) that truth which is worth having is
worth dying for. I suspect that that day which Cardinal Newman
foresaw is not far off, 'when two real and living principles (Catholic-
ism and rationalism) simple, entire and consistent, one in the
Church, the other out of it, (will) at length rush upon one another,
contending not for names and words or half-views, but for ele-
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mentary notions and distinctive moral characters.' I suspect that
science and metaphysics, Cardinal Newman's kind or any other
kind, cannot live together much longer in this world without such
a conflict as may lead to social disintegration.
May I present my credentials. Whether, in the philosophical
sense, you describe me as a naturalist or a materialist is a matter
of indifference. I agree with both schools on so many basic points
that, with few reservations, I can go along with either. With both,
I accept that the inorganic pattern of matter existed prior to the
evolution of conscious organisms, and that it continues and will
continue to exist independently of their consciousness or mine. I
accept as my definition of matter that which is given by the physicist
and chemist. Thus I reject idealism in all its forms.
As my definition of living organisms I accept that which is
given by the evolutionary biologist, and thus I reject vitalism in
all its forms.
As my definition of mind and consciousness I accept that given
by the physiologist, psychologist, and psychiatrist. Consciousness
I see as an incidental manifestation of matter appearing late in or-
ganic evolution, shared qualitatively by all creatures which possess
the requisite nervous system, and increasing in functional activity
with increasing complexity of the nervous system-' Without an
adequate, functional nervous system there can be no mind or con-
sciousness, or any manifestation thereof. Thus I reject dualism in
all its forms.
I also reject what I may designate as supernatural legalism in
nature. There is no warrant for seeking moral laws unique to
moral affairs, any more than there is for seeking laws unique to
biological or chemical or physical affairs. Indeed, the word law
does not belong in this discussion. Science has abandoned the con-
cept of natural law, in the juridical sense of arbiter dicta superim-
posed by supernatural force on the natural universe. This is a
misconception for which metaphysics is largely responsible. All
levels of nature, from atoms and molecules up through the biological
and mental levels, are rigidly cemented together, horizontally and
vertically, by the irreducible fact of deterministic causality. Na-
ture is given, and outstanding among its properties is internal con-
sistency or reliability. Within this irreducible fact of consistency
or reliability, law is merely a description of how one or another
specified collocation of matter behaves under specified conditions,
a behaviour which is determined by its organization and environ-
ment.
I H. W. SMITH, ORGAmSI AND ADAPTATION: DYNAMIC OPPOSITIONS IN ADAP-
TATION. (Ed. by John Romano) Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York
(1949).
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With Francis Bacon,2 "I hold that the universe is not to be nar-
rowed down to the limits of the understanding ..... but the under-
standing must be stretched and enlarged to take in the image of
the universe as it is discovered." Beyond what is known of nature
there remains an unknown (which I do not capitalize) about which
I know not a scintilla, and which therefore I cannot and will not
venture to discuss. I speak of the reliability of nature, but I cannot
explain it. I haven't the faintest idea why the whole universe does
not explode in a wholly unpredictable manner in the next ten sec-
onds. This interesting question must be filed in the drawer labeled
'unknown' and left alone for the time being.
And I mean left well alone. I have been charged with phil-
osophical aberrancy because I am not militantly atheistic, but I am
not militantly atheistic for the good scientific reason that I refuse
to discuss that about which I know nothing. I outrightly deny the
existence of fairies, elfins and sprites on the grounds that did they
exist they - or evidence of their existence - would have been
caught in the biologist's net. Here, as a scientist, I am on firm
ground in my denial. But atheism is the confident assertion that
no god or gods, however conceived, exist. No disciplined scientist
would venture so confident a statement on the basis of no evidence.
How can I deny the existence of supernatural beings when I can-
not set my traps beyond the boundaries of nature? I must simply
admit that I know nothing about the matter and refrain from talk-
ing about an evidential vacuum. I do not know anything about
the ultimate origin or the ultimate end of the cosmos, or why it is
internally so reliable, or why it has the atomic and molecular struc-
ture that it has, or a number of other things, and I am not phil-
osophically abashed to confess these facts3. This position is not
atheism, but agnosticism, as Huxley used the word.
So, while I will not talk about that which is unknown, I say to
you, Mr. Purveyor of Metaphysical Speculation, that I will not
credit your assertions until you bring in substantiating evidence to
show that you know what you are talking about. You personally
may believe what you will, but I strongly resist your forging out
of your unsubstantiated beliefs any so-called values for my client,
you shall not write a single term in his equation for living based
upon your private dreams.
2 Bacon, Parasceve appended to Novomi OaGANmi (Fowler ed. 1878 and
1889).
3 It is not necessary for science to prove that it is All, and science has
never asserted that it is All; on the contrary, every operation of science pre-
supposes an unknown; science is all that we know with reasonable certainty,
but science is also the never-ceasing exploration of the unknown. Science
most emphatically is not All, but what lies beyond the frontiers of science,
of the known, is unknown, and so it must be clearly labeled.
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Now may I present my client: He is a bipedal primate, a mam-
mal, a vertebrate, an animal, a living creature, a fleeting and cor-
ruptible organism composed of atoms and molecules. I challenge
any man to present a scintilla of credible evidence that he is any-
thing more.
The pattern of all organisms is dynamic, spun out of the inter-
play between the organism and its environment. Environment in
part shapes it into what it is, environment sustains it, and, by con-
tinually disturbing it, environment frequently forces it in devious
ways to become something else. Every organism is impelled by its
atomic and molecular make-up to seek such relations with environ-
ment as will minimize its dissatisfactions. To put the matter posi-
tively, every living organism seeks to maximize its satisfactions.
And so it is with man. Like countless millions of other creatures,
he strives, by virtue of his organismal pattern, to maximize his sat-
isfactions. Here is the biological basis for man's natural rights in
terms of which all human values must be adjudicated.
This dynamic interplay between organism and environment is,
relative to the organism, a mixture of good and evil. Against hun-
ger, thirst, cold, heat, danger and fatigue, there stand food, water,
warmth, shade, safety and sleep; against the drives of procreation
there stand the companionship and love of a mate; against the lone-
liness and helplessness of isolation there stand fellowship, confi-
dence, loyalty, the co-operative powers of the clan, the tribe, the
state; against social chaos there stand social stability fostered by
tradition, morality, law and political union; against monotony there
stands recreation; against emotional need there stand imagination,
music, literature and art; against the unknown itself there stand
curiosity and active exploration and self-confidence; against the
errors of preconception and misinterpretation there stands disciplin-
ed doubt. These antitheses all involve value relations. A value is
any relation which actually or potentially promotes satisfaction.
These values are simultaneously subjective and objective; the or-
ganism is one necessary part and in this sense a value is subjective,
while some aspect of environment is the other necessary part, and
in this sense the value is objective.4 All these values are relative
and differ with the individual, with his history, his immediate sub-
jective and objective circumstances, with his imaginative vision of
potential future circumstances. Because men of common cultural
heritage are similar in many respects, even those satisfactions
which are of a highly elective type, moral, social, political values,
may be shared by large numbers of men, but it is fallacious to de-
4 This definition closely follows that of REID, THE NATRE ArD STATUS or
VALUES IN PHILOSOPHY FOR THE FUuRE. THE QUEST OF MODERN MATERIALISu.
The Macmillan Company, New York (1949). It also issues from the philosophi-
cal position expressed in the writer's KAmONGO, Viking Press, New York (1949).
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scribe such values as absolute. It is fallacious to suppose that there
are absolute values because we do not know and have no way of
discovering if such absolutes exist, and the statement is therefore
a statement about nothing at all.
I will rest my case on the assertion that all values have a
naturalistic basis, and I find this basis in the biological fact that
every living organism operates to increase its satisfactions. I claim
that freedom to do this without let or hindrance is the natural
right of man, his by inheritance from two thousand million years of
evolution.
And I charge you, Mr. Metaphysician, with injurying my client
in the exercise of this natural right. In the first instance, you talk
about the 'religious impulse' as though it were some supernal vis a
tergo endeavoring to express itself against an antithetical impedi-
ment intrinsic to time, space and matter. What is religion in the
abstract but an emotional response to life, to the cosmos, to the un-
known? I submit the easily demonstrated fact that emotional exci-
tation represents neural activity in that part of the brain stem
known as the hypothalamus, an ancient part of the brain which is
developed to varying degrees in the fishes, Amphibia, reptiles,
birds and mammals. All these animals emote to some degree under
provocation, the emotion in the state of nature generally having
biological survival value. In man the interconnections between the
cerebral cortex and the ancient hypothalamus remain such that in
the undisciplined state almost any object may cause him to emote
in fear, wonder, delight, anger, awe, this emotion being perceived
as though it were intrinsic to the object, until experience teaches
him that the object is one thing, his emotional response another. I
assert that the religious impulse in its pure form is essentially emo-
tional and has no more significance than any other molecular vi-
bration of the hypothalamus and associated titillation of the sen-
sorium, as observable in the fishes, Amphibia, reptiles, birds, and
mammals generally.
I charge that you attempt to seduce my client, by means of
candles, robes, incense, music, art, and story-telling, and by other
emotional alarms and excitations which titillate the hypothalamus,
into the acceptance of your specious propositions. I ask this court
to enjoin you from using human emotions to gain your ends, from
claiming for any human emotion or mixture thereof any tran-
scendent significance unless and until you adduce proof thereof. I
submit that such proof is not available, and that in its absence my
client is wronged by this deception in that he is led into erroneous
views of himself, of the nature of his cosmos, and of his place in
that cosmos.
On this point, man's place in nature, I charge you with speci-
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fically encouraging my client in the unwarranted conceit that his
position is unique. It was my materialistic science and not your
speculative astrogeny that taught man to be humble, that revealed
to him that his earth is but a minor planet circling an insignificant
star among 100,000,000,000 stars which comprise the galaxy of the
Milky Way. The diameter of this galaxy is of the order of 100,000
light years, the diameter of the earth's orbit about the sun but 1000
light seconds, a discrepancy so great that the mind cannot grasp
it except as a mathematical computation. And yet the total space
revealed with the 100-inch reflector on Mount Wilson is estimated
to hold approximately 100,000,000 galaxies like ours, the most dis-
tant 1,000,000,0005 light years away. There is revelation for you!
- but it does not enhance man's glory.
According to the highly reliable evidence of its radioactive
rocks, the earth upon which he lives is 3,200,000,000 years old, but
man has been an inhabitant of it for less than one three-thousandth
of this time. He is but a comeling in this scheme of things. He has,
however, been here long enough to learn that he is only one of
nearly a million known species of animals that have appeared,
flourished and in many cases disappeared during the 1,000,000,000
years that life has existed on this planet, that he is neither more
nor less important biologically than any one of them, that life itself
is but an incidental physical-chemical phenomenon. Like all other
species of living things, he has come into being by natural evolution.
His mind, like his body, has a natural history and is brought into
existence by natural forces and, like his body, it is corruptible. The
best that can be said for this vaunted mind of his is that it has
biological survival value, when he uses it.
You assert that you eschew pre-philosophical certitudes in your
philosophy, and then you immediately encourage my client in the
unsubstantiated belief that he is somehow favored in this scheme of
things, that something extra-special is in store for him, something
that countless billions of other animals who have lived and suffer-
ed and died will not enjoy. Is this not pre-philosophical in the ex-
treme? You assert that you are against easy ways to comfortable
truths and yet, against the overwhelming evidences of biology,
anatomy, physiology, psychology and psychiatry, against all com-
mon sense, do you not deliberately promulgate that impossible and
utterly irrational doctrine of personal immortality? I charge that
you do, and that by so doing you lead my client not only into false
hopes but into a false view of his true relation to things, and cause
him to commit grievous errors which he might otherwise avoid.
You encourage him to escape into a world of dreams while suffer-
ing and discounting the world of reality. You encourage him to
S 6,000,000,000,000,000,900,000 miles.
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think of tomorrow when his thought should be on today. You tell
him that he is going to be an angel-like being when he is not yet
a reasonably intelligent or well-educated animal. I petition this
court to put an end to the promulgation of these dangerous and
unproved conceits.
The history of human error reveals that at the intellectual level
the most precious value of all values is doubt. By doubting, by
asking questions of his cosmos and by actively exploring it, man
has come into his far-reaching understanding of it, into his power
to control atoms and molecules, power to discipline his body and
his thought, power to control pestilence and disease, to relieve suf-
fering and to prolong life, to build for himself a good home and a
good society.
If doubt is high on my list of values, with you it is frequently
condemned as a dangerous and injurious thing. Again and again
you have condemned my client for challenging accepted belief, and
backed up your condemnation with punishments appropriate to
heresy. Hersey is evil only because it stands in contradiction to ir-
refragable truth. If one accepts the allegedly incontrovertible na-
ture of your metaphysical propositions - such as, for example, your
interpretation of the problem of good and evil - then you were
right through all the centuries when you threw heretics into dunge-
on or the fire. You could not consistently have done otherwise. The
problem of good and evil, if formulated in Christian terms, can only
be solved in the manner by which the Christian church has his-
torically solved it - by the condemnation and extermination of
heretics. But I repeat that not a single one of your propositions
has any evidence in support of it, and consequently I demand as
his natural right that my client be given his intellectual freedom
and permitted to doubt where and when he will.
You assert that you are against all anthropomorphic concep-
tions of God, and then you immediately impute to him that partic-
ular molecular vibration of the hypothalamus and associated titil-
lation of the sensorium called love, and another called anger. Worse,
you fabricate out of the hypothalamic reactions a web of righteous-
ness in which my client is helplessly trapped while he waits fear-
somely for the divine vengeance to strike and destroy him.
When you speak of God you are not using an expression of
mere philosophical convenience. You mean an interest prejudiced
with respect to man's fate, a will implemented by the power to in-
fluence that fate, a conscience shot through and through with moral
values. You mean that birth and death and suffering exist by his
specific permission. Does Apollo still drive the chariot of the sun?
Does Aeolus still stir up the wind or Neptune agitate the sea? Does
Jove still hurl the thunderbolt against his enemies? Need I tell
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you that birth is a somewhat preposterous biological affair of copu-
lation, fecundation and maturation; that death is physical-chemical
disintegration; that life is not preternaturally precious, but natural-
ly so cheap that it spawns itself over the face of the earth until half
the creatures upon it are parasitic, until man himself can only live
as a saprophyte upon the remains of other living things, until short-
ly there will not be sunlight and soil enough to support all the
members of the human race? Need I repeat that every organism
on the face of the earth is fighting every other organism to hang
onto life - life fighting against life for its short and inconsequential
span? You well know that your God, who says of himself, 'Ego
Dominus!', cannot kill a butterfly until the time comes for it to die
a natural death.
On the first and basic problem of existence, the problem of
good and evil, you abandon reason and turn to revelation for an
answer. This is an intellectual default that for you is catastrophic
because it brings your whole supernatural thesis crumbling down
in ruins. It is one thing to say, "Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa
Claus" and quite another to say, "Yes, Virginia, there is a God."
Virginia will certainly ask, "Is God good?" If you answer yes, you
are going to have a difficult time explaining away her toothache. I
prefer to answer, "Virginia, I do not know anything about God,"
and to explain her toothache in terms of vitamins and corruptible
dental enamel.
You cannot tell Virginia whether your God is good or not.
Indeed, I charge that when you talk about God you are talking
about something about which you know absolutely nothing. The
revelation and inspiration which you have hitherto presented as
evidence lack even speciosity, and your personal intuition is no
more reliable. If you were tossing pennies, you would not rely on
your intuition; you would be guided by that tested theory of prob-
ability, the essence of which is that it utterly excludes all super-
natural interference. You would not trust your intuition in find-
ing your way around Chicago. And yet you ask my client to credit
your intuition or the intuition of others in matters where it can be
put to no test whatsoever for verification, and in such important
matters as life and death! I plead with this court that you be en-
joined from passing off these wishful thinkings, warped by a prim-
itive morality of retribution and atonement, as valid philosophical
currency.
'The universe is not to be narrowed down to the limits of the
understanding . . . but the understanding must be stretched and
enlarged to take in the image of the universe as it is discovered.'
Only thus, without preconceptions, without unwarranted specu-
lations, without false visions of himself, can man grow into and en-
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large his natural right. We need not look to far horizons to see
the danger - it is with us here. We are agreed on telephones and
airplanes and automobiles, on vitamins and fertilizers and the ro-
tation of crops, on electrons and galaxies and cosmic rays, on every-
thing which pertains to how to live, but on the basic question of
why we live some of us are almost twenty centuries apart. The
subject is too delicate to discuss in public, and so our textbooks are
skeletons of dead philosophies, our so-called liberal education is a
myth. The fabric of the law is shot through with the unsound fibers
of your metaphysics, the pattern of government is distorted with
its misconceived idealisms, every generation of children is perplex-
ed to find some way out of the intellectual dichotomy which is forced
upon them when they are weaned. We are a people confused and
frequently paralyzed by irresolution, not so much as how to live
as why to live. So pervasive are the stresses engendered by the
irreconcilable contradictions of biology and metaphysical presup-
position that George Brock Chisholm, 6 the psychiatrist, addres-
sing his professional colleagues, has charged that you are in con-
siderable measure responsible for the recurrent surge of war that
devastates the world every twenty years or so. "For a cause (of
war) ", he says, "we must seek some consistent thread running
through the weave of all civilizations we have known and prevent-
ing the development of all or almost all the people to a state of
true maturity. What basic psychological distortion can be found in
every civilization of which we know anything? It must be a force
which discourages the ability to see and acknowledge patent facts,
which prevents the rational use of intelligence, which teaches or
encourages the ability to dissociate and to believe contrary to and
in spite of clear evidence, which produces inferiority, guilt and
fear, which makes controlling other people's personal behaviour
emotionally necessary, which encourages prejudice and the inability
to see, understand and sympathize with other people's points of
view. Is there any force so potent and so pervasive that it can do
all these things in all civilizations? There is -just one. The only
lowest common denominator of all civilizations and the only psycho-
logical force capable of producing these perversions is morality, the
concept of right and wrong....
"We have been very slow to rediscover this truth and to rec-
ognize the unnecessary and artificially imposed inferiority, guilt
and fear, commonly known as sin, under which we have almost all
labored and which produces so much of the social maladjustment
and unhappiness in the world. For many generations we have bow-
ed our necks to the yoke of the conviction of sin. We have swallow-
6 Chisholm, The Reestablishment of Peacetime Society, 9 PsYcIwATRY 3
(1946).
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ed all manner of poisonous certainties fed us by our parents, our
Sunday and day school teachers, our politicians, our priests, our
newspapers and others with a vested interest in controlling us.
'Thou shalt become as gods, knowing good and evil,' good and evil
with which to keep children under control, with which to prevent
free thinking, with which to impose local and familial and national
loyalties and with which to blind children to their glorious intel-
lectual heritage. Misguided by authoritarian dogma, bound by ex-
clusive faith, stunted by inculcated loyalty, torn by frantic heresy,
bedevilled by insistent schism, drugged by ecstatic experience, con-
fused by conflicting certainty, bewildered by invented mystery, and
loaded down by the weight of guilt and fear engendered by its own
original premises, the unfortunate human race, deprived by these
incubi of its only defences and its only reasons for striving, its rea-
soning power and its natural capacity to enjoy the satisfaction of its
natural urges, struggles along under its ghastly self-imposed bur-
den. The results, the inevitable results, are frustration, inferiority,
neurosis and inability to enjoy living, to reason clearly or to make
a world fit to live in...."
It has been said that if metaphysical encouragement were with-
drawn from him, man's life, like Henny Penny's heaven, would
come tumbling down; that without a doctrine of personal immortal-
ity he would have no reason to live at all. I do not believe it. I
contend on the contrary that, for the majority of people in all walks
of life, that doctrine is so impossible to reconcile with common
sense that they pay only a nominal obeisance to it.
I have not observed that biologists, psychologists, psychiatrists,
chemists, engineers, lawyers, physicians, bankers, writers, poets,
musicians, artists, phiosphers, and citizenry in general have suc-
cumbed to suicidal gloom in the face of the proposition that their
prejudices and infirmities are not to be perpetuated throughout
infinite time.
Some argue that without supernatural sanctions society would
crumble into chaos, beyond the power of the police force to hold
it together. I do not believe that, either. There are more than
fifty-seven varieties of supernatural sanctions in the world at large,
and comparative morality reveals that the greater the intellectual
content of a culture, the less significant the supernatural sanction.
Some argue that we must continue to call the unknown by a name,
just for the sake of a name as a handle. Nor do I believe that. A
handle does not make a pot. Man wants the right answer or no
answer -not a speculation falsely labeled truth.
The Reverend John Murray has said to me that my "scientific
monism is . . . a false creed, vacuous, socially destructive and-
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what is perhaps worse- wholly unnecessary." 7 I reply that my
creed is not vacuous but contains the whole of the cosmos, it con-
tains all man's body and mind and all his hopes and despairs; it
contains the supernaturalist's speculations, as well as my stead-
fast refusal to accept those speculations as established fact. I re-
peat that it is the closest approach to truth which man has found.
If it is a false creed then all is deception: atoms and molecules are
not real, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were but fancied episodes, and
you and I are not flesh and blood, but only imagined things. I re-
ply that my creed is not socially destructive. It is the firm founda-
tion upon which man has built his life, his world, the firm founda-
tion upon which he can further realize his dreams. It may be un-
necessary, but in the face of the overwhelming evidence I cannot, in
face of the dire consequences I dare not, indulge anyone in a super-
naturalism which is but a relic of error dating back to man's jungle
days.
Let us search for our values not beyond the stars but in the
stuff of life itself, in the very dynamics of living. I grant you that
man is a fumbling and slow-witted creature, acquisitive, jealous,
quick to make mistakes, and easily stirred to anger. In some re-
spects he is his own worst enemy. But he is forced to struggle for
existence not only with the rest of nature but with his fellowmen
who are pretty much like him. He might have survived, as indeed
he did for many centuries, in a self-centered matriarchial or
patriarchial clan, but as he increased his numbers and competition
became severe he was forced to consider not only his personal in-
terests but those of his neighbors. And he found that in a social
life he gained more than he lost.
The Utopia of an ideal political union is, I conceive, impossible
to achieve, but when Jefferson said that all government is a nec-
essary evil he had possibly just returned from a long ride over
bumpy Virginia roads. All government must in the nature of
things be a mixture of good and evil. If every man would max-
imize his satisfactions, every man must in some degree come
into conflict with other men, and the only alternative to combat
and survival of the strongest is compromise. "What is government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?", Madi-
son asked. Government is the framework which protects and fos-
ters all human freedom; only within it can man realize his natural
rights, however conceived; and within it any philosophy of human
values must undergo its acid test. So pertinent is Madison's rhe-
torical question that I will rest my defense of the naturalistic basis
of values on a single case, the Federal Convention which met in
7 Murray, Religion and Modern Science. Three Interpretations, 28 YALE-
ScEN TIFc MAGAzmN, No. 5, February (1949).
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Philadelphia in 1787 to frame a new government for the Thirteen
States.
In the War for Independence, a loose confederation had been
formed between the thirteen colonies, but the articles of this 'Con-
federation and Perpetual Union', hastily drafted in the midst of
battle fifteen years before, had proved inadequate. The Confed-
eration was no more than a league of political units in which the
prerogatives of individual states remained the source of dissention
and inefficient government, and the basis of last appeal. It lacked
a central executive to administer it and a central judiciary to
guide it. States of contrary opinion could and did pass contradic-
tory laws and go their own way to the injury of others. The Con-
tinental Congress represented government not by the people but
by political units of differing economic, social, and religious in-
terests. In it, each state had one vote regardless of population, and
the Congress itself had so little power that only by begging money
had it been able to finance the war. The colonists had too hastily
experimented with government and the experiment had not worked
very well.
The War for Independence was over, but as Benjamin Rush
said, the revolution -to establish and perfect a new form of gov-
ernment - had only begun. For the first time in history the men
who came to the federal convention - 'the collective wisdom of
the continent,' in the rhetoric of the day - had the opportunity
to create, almost de novo, the kind of government they wanted.
The War had been fought to free the colonists from oppres-
sions which they believed, with good justification, to stem from
the monarchial form of government wherein men's liberties could
be curtailed without their consent. As stated in the Declaration
of Independence, they had come to conceive that the people, the
governed, should comprise the government. Beyond this there
was scarcely a single principle to which all agreed.
It was conceived that the proper functions of a federal gov-
ernment were to secure the country against foreign invasion, to
prevent dissentions among the states, to promote the general bene-
fit through the regulation of interstate trade and the promotion
of interstate interests such as navigation, agriculture, and other
national works, to defend itself against the encroachments or re-
sistance of refractory states, and to supply a national government
superior in law and effect to the state legislatures. But every one
of these functions must operate at some time and in some measure
against the individual and his natural rights, and so, too, a federal
government, however visualized, must operate against the pre-
rogatives of the political units represented by the thirteen par-
ticipating states.
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These basic oppositions emerged in Philadelphia in multitu-
dinous issues: Was a federal government really necessary? Should
state government be abolished? Should a state be charged with
guilt, and punishment inflicted on all its members, innocent and
guilty alike? What would be the prerogatives of the state gov-
ernments which, assuming their continuation, must be subordinat-
ed to a federal judiciary and executive body? How was the federal
judiciary to be selected- by election by the people or by the
state legislatures? How was the federal executive to be selected?
And was this supreme office to consist of one, two, or three men?
Was it to be filled for the term of three years, or the luckier num-
ber seven? Despite the assertion of the Declaration of Independ-
ence, that all men are created equal, all men's votes were not
equally informed, nor should they count equally in the federal
scheme when some men contributed more than others to federal
maintenance. And should the slaves vote? If not, should they be
counted as wealth, population, or neither?
Through the hot summer months of 1787 the Federal Con-
vention wrestled with these knotty problems. That the final docu-
ment, returned to the Federal Congress in September, was an im-
perfect political instrument its authors well knew. Not a man who
signed it but wished it could be different in one detail or another.
It contained no Bill of Rights. It had been formed without the
knowledge of the people. It threatened the rights of private prop-
erty. It put the dangerous power of the veto into the hands of a
single chief executive, called the President in the hope that the
name itself would deter him from trying to make himself into a
king. It established a Supreme court above all recourse and in-
jury. It compromised on the states rights issue. It compromised
between the northern and southern states by counting slaves as
wealth, and it compromised again by consenting to the continu-
ance of the slave trade for twenty years.
Its authors hesitated to believe that, in their wisdom or lack
of it, they could forge a system of government, whatever its checks
and controls, whatever its provisions for amendment, which would
serve a country so great that some of the members of Congress
would have to travel 600 miles in order to reach whatever would
be the seat of the national capitol, which, because of state jeal-
ousies, they hesitated to place in any existing state. But they
signed (all except Rhode Island who held out stubbornly on the
right to issue paper money) the imperfect document that em-
bodied much of the preconception, prejudice and inexperience of
the time, but which also embodied the wisdom of Washington,
Randolph, Franklin, Madison, Wilson, Hamilton, Mason, Patter-
son, and others, as applied to the political dynamics of bringing
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the natural rights of man into balance with the oppositions and
strains engendered by the necessities of living together. They
signed a document, the basic principle of which reflected the
opinion of John Adams, that 'the natural rights of man exist in
the frame of human nature, are rooted in the constitution of the
individual and moral world,' a document that moved to put into
effect the then not so 'self-evident' truth voiced by Jefferson, that
all men are endowed with the inalienable rights to life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness.
Perhaps I need not have labored you with so much history in
order to make the point that government, the most important of
all social values, is an empiric application of the basic biological
dynamic underlying all values, namely the maximization of in-
dividual human satisfactions.
Let me emphasize the word individual. I am not speaking about
societies, states or superstates. Any attempt to identify by analogy
any human society, any state or any superstate as a biological or-
ganism, or to imply that it possesses natural rights of its own,
is a gross biological error.8 The state is only an aggregate of in-
dividuals who are prepared to compromise their individual natural
rights to a greater or lesser degree in the interests of collective
effort. The point is important at the present moment when there
is abroad the view that there is intrinsic in a communal group
some value which does not derive from the natural rights of the
individuals concerned.
You will recall that God was not mentioned once in the new
Constitution. The omission was deliberate, and for good reasons.
The authors, some of them religious, some irreligious men, could
all look back upon strife and persecution engendered by religion
and they saw no reason for including any reference to God in so
important a civil document. They explicitly prohibited the Fed-
eral Government from fostering religion in any form; perhaps
this was pacifism of a sort, but how tragic it would have been
if a majority of the thirteen states, however counted, had carried
the day on our national religious doctrine.
God was mentioned only once in the Federal Convention Hall.
At a crisis in the debate over states rights, when it seemed for
the tenth time that the Philadelphia efforts would go in vain, my
colleague in science, Franklin, speaking from the conviction, for
which he said he had evidence (evidence, incidentally, which he
did not present to the Convention), that God governs in the af-
8 For a further expression of this view see SnIPSON, THE MEAN= OF Evo-
LUTION (Terry Lectures) Yale University Press, New Haven (1949). For a
contrary view see GERARD, A BIOLOGIST'S ViEW OF SOcIETy, University of Chi-
cago Press (in press), and WINGATE, The Rights of Man, A Biological Approach
HuMAN RIGHTs, UNESCO, New York (1949).
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fairs of men, moved that each meeting of the Convention be opened
by prayer. Sherman seconded the motion. Hamilton and others
expressed a variety of opinions. To begin prayers now might
cause talk and lead the public to suspect that there was trouble
behind closed doors. It was not the Quaker custom to have prayers
at political meetings, and this was Philadelphia. Among the dele-
gates were not only Quakers but Episcopalians, Presbyterians,
Methodists, Baptists, Roman Catholics and Deists. It was pointed
out that the Convention had no money to pay a chaplain, anyway.
The motion was never put by chairman General Washington, and
the meeting adjourned without action.
Gentlemen, I promised to present evidence that my client,
when freed from transcendental metaphysics, can stand on his
own feet. As such evidence, I submit the Constitution of the United
States.
I am not a student of government, I have only a vague idea
that sometimes the Constitution works well and sometimes it does
not. I am not in a position to criticise it or recommend any amend-
ment, but it is clear even to a biologist that all is not sweetness
and light. In the rhetoric of the day, one may view with alarm
the circumstance that government has failed to elicit from the
electorate the 'collective wisdom of the continent'; more frequently
than not the poll is a statistical resultant of intentionally or ignor-
antly deceptive oratory, preconception, prejudice and concealment,
of ambition and avarice. One may view with alarm the develop-
ment of the Federal Government in the direction of a paternalism
that discourages industry, thrift and economic independence; with
so much emphasis upon what society owes to every man under
the Bill of Rights, there is little consideration of what every man
owes to society under what the biologist, Conklin,9 has called the
unwritten Bill of Duties. One may view with alarm the danger
of a 'World Recovery Program' whereby the economic resources
of this and other countries will be drained and the standard of
living substantially lowered in order to maintain viable the dense
populations of the poverty-stricken countries of the earth; the
general good of all mankind is not an ultimate, absolute value,
for 'all mankind' is but an aggregate which has as such no natural
rights that do not issue from the rights of the individuals concerned,
both those who are to be benefited and those who are to be com-
promised. One may view with alarm our failure to arrive at that
world Utopia visualized by Franklin, a land where a philosopher
would be at home in any part; even as the Federal Convention
was divided by political states rights, we remain today divided by
metaphysical states rights.
9 CorNLM, MAIN: REAL AMD IDEAL, Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York (1943).
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These alarms are ameliorated, however, by a long view of
history. Civilization extends back scarcely more than five or six
thousand years; empiric science, except for a brief, abortive period
in Greece, not much more than three hundred years; our Consti-
tutional Republic only one hundred and sixty-three years; scarcely
ninety years ago it was torn by civil war, thirty-three years ago
by a war with Germany, nine years ago by a second war with that
same country, each war a catastrophe reducing by a substantial
measure the opportunity for the maximization of any human satis-
factions even as it saved the opportunity as a whole. But it is not
science that has failed. It is the adequate dissemination and appli-
cation of science that is deficient to a point threatening our wel-
fare. What is taught in our schools is too much the science of
gadgets and not enough the science of man. Our textbooks are
adroitly written to conceal and frequently to mislead, lest they
offend one or another of a variety of religious beliefs, it being as-
sumed that any and all religious beliefs, because they are relig-
ious, are necessarily right, whereas in fact we have no reason
whatever to believe that any of them are right, and certainly most
of them are wrong.
To repeat, I rest my case on the assertion that all values have
a naturalistic basis which I find in the biological fact that every
living organism operates to maximize its satisfactions. I claim that
freedom to do this without unjust let or hindrance is the natural
right of man, his by inheritance from two thousand million years
of evolution. If I understand him correctly, one of the most dis-
tinguished Catholic philosophers in this country dismisses freedom
itself (with what he calls its individualistic overtone) as merely
an idea, a product not so much of metaphysic as of a myth or
mood.'0 If I am correct, then the conflict between us is even more
fulminant than I supposed, for this is a declaration that he and
his church are enemies not only of democracy but also of biology.
Freedom is not the product of any metaphysic or of any myth or
mood; it is not even something which we once had in the Garden
of Eden but lost in consequence of the affair of the apple; it is
something that every organism has been fighting for ever since
life first stirred in the primeval mud. The effort to attain it is the
dynamic of life itself, and that effort will never cease so long as
the pulse of life beats its dynamic rhythm.
10 Murray, supra note 7 at p. 63.
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